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European integration is largely seen as a process that has delivered stability and 
peace, as well as the economic prosperity of the Member States of the European 
Union (EU). It has helped to raise standards of living and build an internal market. 
But, there are more and more arguments that the EU decision-making system is not 
effective and the governance model is obsolete. Some are pointing out increasingly 
rising divergence on crucial EU policy matters. Others are arguing that the EU 
has been confronted with the challenge of heterogeneity, stressing the issue of 
immigration as the one of the most contentious policy matters currently facing the 
EU. Besides those controversial issues inside EU and different positions among 
member states there is Brexit.  
 
The paper analyses in particular the issue of EU economic governance and one of 
its main pillars – the European Semester. The Country Specific Recommendations, 
as the integral part of the economic governance model are presented in a view of 
the new framework envisaged to tighten budgetary coordination and keep the 
deficit and debt levels in accordance to the EU rules.  
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We – Europeans are living in the challenging world. There are so many issues that 
have confronted the process of the European integration. The new EU economic 
governance architecture that has been introduced after the financial and economic 
crisis is questioned in the light of the new developments. While the EU policy-
making is getting broader agenda of cooperation, with almost no policy domain 
untouched, the results of the economic governance are not encouraging. On 
political front there is a huge distraction caused by the one country (United 
Kingdom) leaving the membership of the European Union. Therefore, today is 
more than ever appropriate to challenge the issues of the European integration and 
governance. 
 
In accordance to the developments of the EU research this work firstly starts with 
the analysis of the European integration. As the second phase of the research on the 
European Union that occurred in early 1990s was completely oriented to the 
analysis of the EU governance process, the second part of this paper is devoted to 
the EU policy-making process. The main intention of the work is to analyse the 
European economic governance system and its main coordination instrument so-
called the ‘European Semester’(ES) with the associated Country Specific 
Recommendations (CSRs). Therefore, the third part of the paper is about the 
European Semester and the CSRs.  
The concept of the European integration is presented to be followed by the analysis 
of the main actors of the EU integration and the institutional framework. Also, the 
historical development of the integration process is given in a form of the short 
overview. The issue of the European economic governance, especially the 
coordination and supervision of the fiscal policy is in the main focus of the work, 
as it is crucial for the further integration process. Third part is devoted to the 
implementation and effectiveness of the Country Specific Recommendations. 
Lastly, some conclusions are drawn upon. 
 
2. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  
 
It is definitely true saying of Diez and Wiener (2018) that “There is surely no 
shortage of books on the European integration (EI)”. After analysing the literature 
on the European integration one should agree that it is a booming field and it is 
difficult to make a selection of the appropriate literature as they are growing 
continuously. The vast majority of literature is dealing with the economic 
integration of countries and regions. This is still remained an intensely debated 
topics, both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. Theoretical discussions 
are essentially articulated around the concept of convergence/divergence in per 
capita income, as well as the possible trade-off between efficiency at country level 




There is also considerable part of the EI literature that has in the main focus 
process of institutional-building and political integration at the European level. 
Most of the studies recognized existence of the two inter-related processes at the 
European level. First one is in regard to the policy competences that are delegated 
to the supranational level to achieve particular policy outcomes. The second one is 
related to the creation of the new bodies and institutions at the European Union 
level. Goetz and Mayer-Sahling (2009) comment that is a completely “new set” of 
political institutions with executive, legislative and judicial powers that have been 
established. The governance issue was recently introduced in the EI literature and 
more on the way how the power is exercised in the EU, having focus on the policy-
making process.  
 
At the beginning of the research on the European Union the primarily focus was on 
the explanations of the European integration process - the process where national 
sovereignty is transferred from domestic level to the European level (Diez and 
Wiener, 2018). Later on in the beginning of 1990s the governance issue started to 
dominate at the academic level. The studies that resulted from the research were 
more oriented to the policy analysis in order to explain the process of policy 
formulation and its implementation. That development coincided with and was 
stimulated by an increase in European level policy-making competencies of the 
Single European Act1 and the single market. As the European governance has 
developed over time it was evident that the concept included more and more areas 
of EU policy-making activities (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006).  
 
The last decades were also characterized by the development of different 
integration theoriesthat have emerged after the first attempt to explain the EU 
integration done by functionalists and Monnet. Rosamond (2016)argues that “all 
important theories2 of the European integration generate multiple perspectives on 
the practice of the integration. Earlier integration theories were focused usually 
only to the one research objective - how to explain a state’s decision in favour of 
supranational institutional building. Today the most of the European integration 
research topics deal with the work of the EU’s formal institutions or with some 
particular policies”. But, as Diez and Wiener (2018) conclude “the concise 
overview of the integration theory still remains rare”. The reason is caused by the 
changing environment and the changing substance of the process, so any attempt to 
conceptualize the integration theory as a ‘mosaic’ that is constituted by a range of 
                                                          
1The Single European Act (SEA) was the first major revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. 
The Act set the European Community an objective of establishing single market by 31 
December 1992. 
2Those are: neo-functionalism (Hass, 1958, Lindberg, 1963), inter-governmentalism 
(Hoffmann, 1966, Taylor, 1982), federalism (Spinelli, 1972), liberal-intergovernmentalism 
(Moravicsik, 1998), multi-level governance (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996), historical 
institutionalism (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 19979, and sociological constructivism (Risse 
in Diez and Wiener, 2003).  
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distinct theoretical standpoints rather than a ‘grand theory’ would be the most 
suitable approach (Wiener, 2018). 
In order to capture different aspects of the European integration process the 
elaboration of several elements need to be done. Firstly, the short historical 
overview of the development of the process of European integration is presented. 
Then, the institutional framework and main actors are reviewed as they are 
necessary for understanding the EU governance model. 
 
2.1.  History and the main characteristics of the process of European 
integration  
 
The formal start of the process of the European integration was marked by the year 
1951 when the six countries agreed upon the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ESCS). The so-called Treaty of Paris was signed on 18 April 
1951 and came into force on 25 July 1952. It was for the first time that six 
European States agreed to work towards integration. The Treaty laid the 
foundations of the Community by setting up an executive known as the ‘High 
Authority’, a Parliamentary Assembly, a Council of Ministers, a Court of Justice 
and a Consultative Committee. The founders of the ECSC were clear about their 
intentions for the Treaty to be the first step towards a ‘European Federation’. The 
common coal and steel market was gradually extended to other economic spheres.  
 
The next event was also signing of another treaty – Treaty of Rome that was signed 
in 1957. With that Treaty the European Economic Community (EEC) was 
established and the European Atomic Energy Community. Unlike the ECSC 
Treaty, the Treaties of Rome were concluded for an unlimited period of time. Later 
on, in May 1992, the Maastrich Treaty was signed. It was important as it marked 
the beginning of a ‘new stage in the process of creating an ever-closer union among 
the people of Europe’ by giving the previous communities a political dimension. 
The Treaty covers issues of Economic and Monetary Union and regulates 
coordination of economic policies of Member States (MSs). The multilateral 
surveillance of this cooperation and financial and budgetary discipline were also 
introduced. 
 
Besides the Treaties the European integration is also characterized by the 
enlargements of the countries. After the original six countries in 1973 three more 
countries (Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom) joined the EC. In 1981 Greece 
became the new member of the EC, marking the start of a decade of increased 
expansion and integration. Portugal and Spain become EU members in 1986. The 
biggest enlargement was in 2004 when ten new countries joined the EU- Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. In 2007 Bulgaria and Romania become the 26th and 27th members of the 
EU and on June 1, 2013 Croatia joined the EU. The main important events of the 
European integration are elaborated in the following table (Table 1).  
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Table 1. Timeline of the European integration (EI) 
Year  Event 
1951 The Treaty of Paris is signed by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands (the ‘Original Six’), creating the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
1957 The Treaty of Rome is signed as the first step towards establishing the 
common market, customs union and free movement of capital and 
labour. The European Economic Community (EEC) is established.  
1958 The first European Commission takes office. 
1965 The Merger Treaty is signed in Brussels. It merges the executives of the 
ECSC, EEC to become collectively known as the European 
Communities (EC). 
1973 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom formally join the EC. 
1981 Greece becomes the 10th member of the EC. 
1986 Portugal and Spain become members of the EC. 
1987 The Single European Act (SEA) comes into force. 
1992 The Maastrich Treaty is signed. 
1999 On 1 January, the Euro is launched as the official currency in 11 out of 
the 15 EU MSs. 
2004 On 1 May10 new countries joined the EU (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia). 
2007 Bulgaria and Romania become the 26th and 27th members of the EU on 1 
January.  
2011 European Semester was introduced 
2013 Croatia becomes the 28the Member State of the EU. 
Source: based on www.civitas.org.uk/content/history 
 
It is evident that the dominant feature of the European integration is about signing 
of the different treaties. Namely, the European Union is based on a serious of 
treaties, pacts and agreements which have increased over time. The second 
characteristic of the European integration process is connected to the issue of the 
membership. The growing number of the Member States and enlargements shaped 
the European integration process that has tended to occur in waves, particularly 
accelerated since the early 1980s. 
 
For Schimmelfenning (2018) the history of the European integration is a story of 
growth. From its initial specialisation in coal and steel industry it developed in 
several areas. The European Union’s roots, as well as start of the European 
integration were situated within the post-world war II context. At that time, the 
integration was indicated by the move towards founding the ECSC, and “motivated 
by the need to prevent future security threats based on the means of economic 
collaboration” (Wiener, 2018). These two industries had a key role and initiated 
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regional collaboration that was based on a strategic decision to build and preserve a 
peace. The enhanced economic collaboration in other sectors appeared later on as it 
was agreed with the Single European Act.  
 
The Schumann declaration led in 1951 to the European Coal and Steel Community 
among six countries (France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg). The ECSC was then used as the institutional template for two 
proposed communities (the European Defence Community and the European 
Political Community) which included the formation of a common army, a common 
budget, and common institutions with significant legislative and executive powers. 
For Moravcsik (1999) it would have basically amounted to a European federation. 
Next important date occurred in 1955 when few politicians, including Jean 
Monnet, created an ‘Action Committee for the United States of Europe’. Alesina 
and Perotti (2004) state that the “attempt to integrate European defence and foreign 
policy was not finished successfully”. 
 
The Treaty of Rome (1957) expresses in its preamble the necessity for Member 
States “to strengthen the unity of their economics and to ensure their harmonies 
development by reducing existing differences. This clearly communicates the 
willingness to contain (regional) disparities from the very start of the European 
integration process.  
 
In 1987 the Single European Act (SEA) comes into force and modifies the Treaty 
of Rome with the aim to complete the formation of a common market.  The 
national vetoes are abolished by introducing Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in 
the Council of Ministers for areas relating to the single market (based on ‘four 
freedoms’). The SEA was the first commitment by Member States to create 
‘European Union’. 
 
In 1992 the Maastrich Treaty was signed. It turns the European Community into 
the ‘European Union’ (EU)3. The Treaty also introduced the principle of 
‘subsidiarity’4 stated that “in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Community shall take actions, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed actions cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the 
scale of effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community5”.The 
principle of ‘subsidiarity’ is also a key pillar of European governance architecture 
and made full use of the advantages of diversity within the EU. All those events in 
                                                          
3The Treaty includes developments for monetary union and a chapter on social policy. It 
also introduced the concept of EU Citizenship, which give Europeans the right to live and 
vote in elections in any EU country. The Treaty is also relevant as it reorganised and 
redefined the European institutions. 




the history of the European integration can be called as ‘critical juncturies‘. They 
marked the way how the process was shaped and dictated further development not 
only at the EU level but also at the national-state front.  
 
For Spolaore (2015) the process of the European integration is all about successes 
and failures.  “The history of European institutional integration started with an 
early success (the formation of a coal and steel community, proposed with the 
Schuman declaration in 1950 and established with the Treaty of Paris in 1951), and 
a dramatic failure (the collapse of the defence and political community in 1952). 
Those two different experiences motivated the subsequent strategy of the European 
integration” (Spolaore, 2015). The failures have a special attention for Spolaore as 
they are “keys to understanding the beginning of the integration process, its 
setbacks, and the following path of European integration”. 
Alesinaet. al. (1997) see that the trade-off between costs and benefits is central to 
the political feasibility and stability of European integration.  Potential benefits 
from full political unification include economies of scale in the provision of federal 
public goods (such as defence and security). Accordingly, Spolaore (2015) argues 
that the main issues lie in a general problem of the political economy: the trade-off 
between costs and benefits when heterogeneous groups are politically integrated 
under a common authority. Namely, “the formation of a European federation 
across heterogeneous populations, which share diverse social and economic 
structures, languages, cultures and identities, would come with several benefits, but 
also with high costs”.  
 
Namely, they state that the “political unification comes with significant costs when 
various groups speak different languages, share different cultural norms and 
identities, and have different preferences for public policies and institutions 
“(Alesinaet. al., 1997). The highest form of economic integration is a single market 
in which all producers and consumers are governed by the same rules and treated 
equally. If countries within a single market agree to coordinate their economic 
policies than is a case of the economic union, while in the event that countries 
within a single market agree to common policies in almost every sector one can 
speak about political union. 
 
Caporaso (1998) concludes that in order to anticipate the future of the European 
integration it is necessary to understand the past events that shaped the process. He 
added “that the subject matter of the European integration is inherently dynamic 
and involves changes over time in the structure of supranational governance. To 
develop coherent explanations of constantly moving phenomena presents a 
daunting challenge.”(Caporaso, 1998) 
Spolaore (2015) elaborated issues of heterogeneity and points out that “the creation 
of layers of distinct and overlapping jurisdictions, each organized around a subset 
of public functions and policies with different economies of scale and 
heterogeneity costs, faces limitations and challenges both in terms of economic 
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efficiency and political stability.” Different populations with different histories, 
cultures and identities are likely to disagree over the type of government in charge 
of such a federation, so heterogeneity could be reason to explain failures to 
integrate in the past and that the “realistic supporters of European integration 
understand that convergence of political preferences through reduction of linguistic 
and cultural barriers, will be a slow and gradual process, which should take place 
naturally and consensually” (Spolaore, 2015). As a result, heterogeneity of 
preferences is mostly beneficial when people interact about rival goods but costly 
when sharing non-rival goods. The European integration has been much more 
successful when fostering economic exchanges and a common market, while it has 
stalled when attempting to pool ‘federal’ public goods, such as defence and 
security (Spolaore, 2015). Therefore, the idea of the European federation with its 
own budget and redistribution policies that could provide insurance against 
asymmetric shocks was accepted. A later on a growing literature has explored the 
links between measures of heterogeneity and political outcomes, such as the 
provision of public goods, the extent of redistribution, the quality of government, 
and the likelihood of civil and international conflict. 
 
Some authors distinguish different dimensions of the European integration. 
Schimmelfenning (2018) is speaking about so-called sectoral integration that refers 
to a process through which policy areas or sectors are regulated at the EU level. 
There is also another dimension of the integration often called as a vertical 
integration. It is mainly about the distribution of competencies between the EU 
institutions. Once can speak about a horizontal integration that refers to the 
territorial extension of sectoral and vertical integration. That integration is 
commonly accepted ad the ‘EU enlargement’. 
 
Lastly, as another relevant feature of the European integration the matter of 
complexity is put forward. The complexity is caused not only by a big cast of 
actors (including governments, technocrats, interest groups, and voters), who in 
turn pursue a range of economic and political goals. The complexity of the 
institutional framework is also evident especially at the EU level where a new 
institutional constellation has been established. The several new institutions and 
bodies have been either established or substantially strengthened. Also some new 
roles have been given to parliamentary bodies. The reforms of European 
governance led also to an adaptation of the institutions, especially European 
Commission. 
 
2.2.  Main actors and the institutional framework of the European integration 
 
The European Commission is in the centre of the process of the European 
integration and as Bauer and Becker (2014) state “It is powerful player in the 
European governance system. The Commission is an independent body and has an 
exclusive right of initiative”. Namely, the Commission has a supranational 
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executive’s role in financing stability support, economic policy surveillance, 
coordination of national policy and supervision of the financial sector. In 
accordance to the Treaty the Commission role is to promote the general interest of 
the Union and take appropriate initiatives (Article 17 TEU). The Commission is 
also responsible for ensuring the application of primary and secondary EU law, 
executing the budget and managing programs, as well as exercising coordinative, 
executive and management functions. Its authority varies depending on the 
decision-making procedures governing the respective policy field.  
 
But, its primary role is changing. When the European stability architecture 
emerged, its competences grew more complex. Commission expertise is employed 
at various stages in the process of granting financial assistance, mostly along with 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and IMF (so-called troika).  
Bauer and Becker (2014) argue that “while the EU agenda-setting power is 
decreasing most decisions in economic governance depend on the Commission to 
make them work”. The governance architecture of financial stability support 
involves the Commission in various capacities. It proposed decisions on granting 
assistance, negotiates conditionality agreements and monitors compliance. The 
Commission in liaison with the ECB (and where appropriate with the IMF) also 
monitors the implementation of the adjustment programmes. It also examines 
changes to the adjustment programme and if observes significant deviations it 
makes proposals on the further steps. For Bauer and Becker (2014) “the 
Commission fulfils crucial tasks in all phases of the particular policy cycle”. 
 
In regard to the national institutional framework involved in European integration 
and governance De Streel (2013) observes that was initially’ relatively simple’. 
Namely, the EU requirements in that regard were mainly related to the provision of 
statistics and were minimal. There were also no clear sanctions if the Member 
States manipulated with statistic data. Such situation existed until 2009 when a new 
regulation on national fiscal statistics was adopted. A year later was revised, 
besides other things, to increase the investigation power of Eurostat. In 2011 with 
the introduction of the European Semester and ‘Six-pack’ the minimum quality for 
the budgetary framework defined as ‘the set of arrangements, procedures, rules and 
institutions that underlie the conduct of budgetary policies of general government’ 
was introduced. Thus, all Member States must have in place public accounting 
systems, subject to internal control and independent audits, adopt realistic 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts and establish a credible, effective 
medium-term budgetary framework6.   
 
The European integration has achieved results which would not have been possible 
by individual Member States (MSs) acting on their own. Membership of the 
European Union confronts government with a set of particularly testing 
                                                          
6Article 5 Regulation 473/2013 
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organizational and managerial challenges. On one hand it requires abilities to form 
coherent national positions in the EU decision-making. On the other, the EU 
accession calls for institutional-building, supplant of new institutions that embody 
a new type of organizational culture and new way of policies. 
 
The role of directly elected European Parliament (EP) is rapidly changing as it is 
taking a new tasks becoming a co-legislator. Through the co-called co-decision 
procedure a number of regulations and directives need to be adopted by both the 
Council and the EP before they become binding ‘legislation’. 
 
The process of policy coordination within the European integration was link to the 
deliberative and consensual quality of EU decision-making. “Deliberation and 
consensus-seeking have long been taken as the behavioural hallmarks of supra-
nationalism, but in the post-Maastrich period they have imposed themselves as 
dominant norms regulating the relations between national actors” (Bickerton, 
Hodson and Puetter (2015). European Council is a deliberative and consensus-
building body per excellence. 
 
There are also some newly created institutions that are established and have 
autonomy (by way of executive or legislative power), as well as a control over their 
own resources. They fulfil certain functions and have a mechanism for the Member 
state representation as a part of their governance structure. Those new institutions 
include the European Central Bank, the European External Action Services 
(EEAS), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and numerous regulatory and 
executive agencies.  
 
The process of the European integration has evolved through times, following by 
the evolution of the European governance especially over the last decade. De Streel 
(2013) describes it as a‘remarkable process’. The establishment of European 
economic governance is mainly based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and regulations adopted by the Council while the 
implementation relies mainly on recommendations proposed by the Commission 
and adopted by the Council.  “Those recommendations do not have direct binding 
effect as their violation cannot lead to an infringement case at the Court of Justice. 
However, they have indirect binding effect as their violation may lead to an 
investigation and the imposition of sanctions by the Council”(De Streel, 2013). 
 
Co-ordination between actors is built into the Treaty for economic, fiscal and 
employment policies with a system of guidelines and multilateral surveillance. The 
Council assumes a key role in relation to coordinating processes. Hodson and 
Maher (2000) state “the Commission’s role of analysis, neutrality and synopsis is 
different from the one under the classic Monnet method, but also weakened with its 
agenda-setting function”. The Commission can trigger a number of procedures, but 
in the form as a recommendation and not proposal. There are opinions that the 
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Commission is gradually losing political clout, while several authors (like Bauer 
and Becker, etc.) are on contrary arguing that the role of the Commission has been 
considerably strengthened after the latest financial and economic crisis. 
 
In the time of crisis, the role of the Commission was not very visible, but after the 
crisis “in the reformed economic governance architecture its role has changed and 
has been more strengthened”. Due to the new given responsibilities the 
Commission has been in charge for the implementation of numerous reforms. 
Bauer and Becker (2014) state the Commission “has been entrusted with ever 
wider and deeper implementation tasks that are of the high political importance”. 
Also, several new developments happened after the financial and economic crisis 
and influenced that the overall European integration setting was changed. The EP 
has been empowered and “progressive political leadership by the European Council 
and proliferation of new regulatory institutions has been influenced at new power 
settings” (Bauer and Becker, 2014). The power relations between institutions also 
changed due to the differences within the certain policy area.  
 
3. EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE 
 
The dominant feature of EU governance is a ‘community method’ for which 
Scharpf (2003) used the term ‘joint-decision mode’. Such a method is characterised 
by a strong role of the European Commission in the formulation and execution of 
Community legislation. All legislation is adopted by the Council of Ministers, but 
before a Council of Ministers several committees discuss and work out to find 
compromise solutions. For some authors (like Hodson and Mahler, 2001) as a 
reaction to the imminent risk of deadlock in Community decision-making the ‘new 
modes of governance’ were introduced so called the ‘open method of co-
ordination’ (OMC). Such a method of governance was established by the 
Maastricht Treaty7 as an instrument destined for the co-ordination of national 
primarily economic policies through the use of recommendations and guidelines. It 
departs from the Community method (of legislating through regulations and 
directives) relying on ‘soft lax’ which is not legally binding and has no legal 
sanctioning mechanisms against non-compliance. OMC is about ‘benchmarking’, 
‘peer review’ and ‘best-practice’. The underlying assumption is that participating 
actors can learn from assessment and comparison (Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004).  
 
Lebessis and Paterson (1998) are of an opinion that the open method is being 
focused on horizontal learning processes and peer pressure where individual action 
runs counter to broadly accepted principles. They also see OMC as a “dynamic 
process and decentred as modus operandi without any particular rule or single 
policy objective as an objective”. Swyngedow (2004) argue that ‘since the rules 
                                                          
7 The OMC was officially introduced in May 2000 at the Lisbon European Council. 
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and practice of participation do not guarantee equality between actors the multitude 
of actors is still far from promoting EU democracy’.  
Another element of EU governance is its multi-level nature. The concept of ‘multi-
level-governance’ (MLG)8represents a system of continuous negotiation among 
governments. It assumes that decision-making authority is not monopolised by the 
governments of the MSs, but that is diffused to different levels of decision-making.  
European policymaking is also characterised by specific features that distinguish it 
from policy-making at national level. These features are linked to the institutional 
structure of the EU and its role vis-à-vis the Member States.  
 
The EU itself has no competences to implement policies directly. The implications 
are that the EU is dependent on national governments for policy implementation. 
Therefore, Tommel and Verdun (2009) conclude that the European policy-making 
often ‘entails strategies and procedures that direct the behaviour of decentralised 
actors on due implementation’. 
 
Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2006) added that “despite the omnipresence of 
’governance’ in the study of the EU governance is still ambiguous and under-
specified as a concept, let alone as a theory. But as the term ‘governance 
perspective’ suggests, governance research on the EU comprises works with a 
shared interest in the transformation of governance beyond the state through 
normative and empirical-analytical lenses”. Furthermore, they argue that in spite of 
rapidly and increasingly diversified literature on (new) modes of governance in the 
EU policymaking, theoretical reflection and empirical research have not resulted in 
a clear conceptualisation of the governance approach, let alone in a stringent 
methodology for its application to the analysis of new forms of policymaking.  
 
For Tommel and Verdun (2009) ‘a wide variety of competing concepts, 
interpretations, and perceptions of the term governance and its meaning coexists in 
the literature’. Wallace and Young (1997) argues that a special form of policy co-
ordination involving national and Community officials allow the Member State 
governments to retain considerable control but still transform the ways in which 
states traditionally go about doing their business. 
 
3.1. Institutional framework of the EU governance 
 
Current institutional framework of the EU governance is contemplated around the 
open method of-coordination (OMC).In practice it means that the EU economic 
governance consists of three Council committees9 that are involved in the everyday 
                                                          
8 It was developed by Marks in 1993. 
9The Economic and Finance Committee (EFC) is an advisory committee of ECOFIN and 
has consultative and review functions, being responsible for the co-ordination of fiscal 
policy through the operation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Another Committee is 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) with a role to monitor structural policy. 
197
 
work and preparation of the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers 
(ECOFIN). It is often saying that such co-ordination is associated with 
convergence towards predetermined targets, as the Member States agree on 
keeping the agreed economic indicators up to the certain limits, namely to maintain 
their budget deficits within 3 per cent of GDP and their medium–term budgetary 
position close to balance or in surplus. Therefore, the European economic 
governance is enforced through multi-lateral surveillance and the excessive deficit 
procedure. The former requires each Member State to formulate a Stability 
Programme or Convergence Programmes in the case that the state is outside the 
euro-area. In the event of deviation from the predetermined targets, the Council can 
issue a recommendation for corrective action. In the event of an infringement the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) can be triggered, culminating in formal 
sanctions, including fines. 
 
The main instrument for a co-ordination of economic policies are so-called the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) that are drawn up annually by the 
Commission and Council and adopt by the European Council. The consistency of 
national economic policies with the economic objectives of the Union was 
assessed. The economic policies of Member States are coordinated through the 
BEPGs (in accordance to Article 121.2 of TFEU) as an annual exercise.  
 
In 2011, the European Semester was introduced to make the coordination of 
national economic polices more effective.  As Benassy-Quere (2015) comments 
“the objective of the European Semester was to transform BEPGs into a binding 
process”.  
 
European economic governance could be described as a system of multilateral 
negotiating or networking in order to coordinate national policies. It is often state 
that it takes form of supranational, European economic government. The economic 
governance framework was established with the Treaty of Maastricht (in 1992) and 
enforced with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 1997. According to De Streel 
(2013) the economic governance is based on three main areas, namely: 
1. the coordination of the Member States' economic policies (Article 121 
TFEU), 
2. the prohibition of financial solidarity among Member States (Art 125 TFEU) 
except in very extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the States 
(Art 122 TFEU) and the prohibition of monetary financing by the European 
Central Bank and the National Central Banks (Art 123) and 
3. limits to fiscal deficits to 3% of GDP and public debt to 60% of GDP (with 
sanctions decided by the Council in order to force sustainable fiscal policies). 
 
The economic governance at European level takes two forms. The first one is so-
called a 'soft’ and it is known as the Open Method of Coordination. It also rests on 
moral persuasion and peer-pressure. The second one is a 'hard’ governance and it is 
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based on a mechanism of material sanctions and it is best exemplified by the 
Stability and Growth Pact.  
The current governance model is result of several changes introduced to make it 
more efficient and transparent. Therefore, the economic governance framework 
was reformed several times. The first reform was in 2005 and initiated with the 
situation in which the Stability and Growth Pact was not strictly implemented. 
Schuknecht et al. (2011) are arguing that on the request of some MSs (most vocally 
France and Germany) the full application of the provisions of the corrective arm of 
the Pact was not followed. Its strict implementation was blocked. The Commission 
recommendation to move a step further in the direction of sanctions under the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) was rejected. The reasons/arguments put 
forward were mainly concentrated around the fact that the specific situation of each 
Member States were not taken into account, especially phase of the economic cycle 
in each country.  
 
The main aim of the reform was to strengthen the surveillance and coordination, as 
well as to clarify some procedures related to the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP). Reform was also targeting to enable a better national ownership and allow 
for more details in the recommended economic policy. 
 
The second reform of the economic governance was initiated after the European 
economic and financial (debt) crisis. Namely, during the crisis it was evident that 
the current EU governance model was not properly designed to tackle such 
circumstances. Therefore, in 2011 the effectiveness of the Stability and Growth 
Pact was once again put into question. It was further reinforced with the so-called 
'Six-pack'10, which has been created to enhance the surveillance in the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure and sanction procedures. Several other features were also 
introduced in the system of economic governance, of which the minimum 
requirements for budgetary planning and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
(MIP)11, are the most important.  
 
In the reform that was initiated in 2013 the so-called 'Two-Pack' was introduced 
with common budgetary timeline and rules for Member States. The new element 
was also a system of enhanced economic and budgetary surveillance for those 
Member States that have experienced financial stability difficulties or those that 
                                                          
10 Six-pack consists of five regulations that are aimed to strength the implementation of 
efficient budgetary surveillance and enforce measures to correct excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances, as well as to introduce requirements for budgetary frameworks in the Member 
States. 
11 The MIP is also a form of a surveillance mechanism which is aimed to identify the 
potential risk in the early stage and prevent macroeconomic imbalances and correct those 
that are already in place. 
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receive financial assistance from the European Financial Stability Facility12 (EFSF) 
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a permanent crisis resolution 
mechanism for euro-area Member States. There for the enhanced SGP became a 
part of the European Semester that presents the EU’s annual cycle of economic 
policy guidance and surveillance.  
 
Although the European economic governance model went through all that changes 
it is evident that the framework is still not properly enforced. Namely, the 
governance model is still incomplete since it did not prevent the build-up of fiscal 
imbalances in some Member States, as well as it failed to identify (and remedy) the 
triggers of the crisis in countries (like Ireland and Spain).   
 
There is also problem with the enforcement mechanism in the European economic 
governance model. The enforcement mechanism used by economic governance 
present two main differences compared with the standard enforcement based on 
sanctions decided by courts. The first difference is that enforcement of economic 
governance rules is mainly based on voluntary actions by Member States and peer 
pressure, and, only as a last resort, on sanctions. The second difference is that the 
sanctions are not decided by independent courts, but are proposed by the 
Commission and decided by the Council.  Unfortunately, the last decade shows that 
such an enforcement system was not very effective (De Streel, 2013).  
 
Also, one of the issues of the EU economic governance model is a problem with 
the national ownership. In spite that all reforms have been tackled that issue in 
order to influence and improve the national ownership still a lot need to be done. 
The ownership was tried to improve by requiring a minimum quality for national 
fiscal institutions, thenwith the establishment of a national correction mechanism 
(in parallel to the excessive deficit procedure) and by the coordination of policies 
during the first semester of the year before the adoption of national decisions 
during the second semester. 
 
De Streel (2013) concluded that recent reforms also increase the possibilities of 
sanctions which may be imposed earlier in the Excessive Deficit Procedure, and 
also during the annual multilateral surveillance.  
 
The Commission conducted a review of the SGP in 2014 and highlighted both the 
strengths and the possible areas for improvement of the framework of the economic 
governance. The year after (in 2015) the Commission issued guidance on how it 
intends to apply the SGP rules to strengthen the link between structural reforms, 
investment and fiscal responsibility in support of jobs and growth. 
 
                                                          
12 EFSF was introduced in June 2010 for the euro area MSs and provided financial 
assistance to Ireland, Portugal and Greece.  
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The current structure of the economic governance framework is based on four 
pillars (De Streel, 2013) of which each of them has its own objectives and methods, 
with strong differentiation between the countries which are in the euro-area and 
those which are outside. The first pillar of economic governance is a fiscal 
surveillance that aims to control, and if necessary correct, the fiscal imbalances of 
the Member States. It consists official rules − i.e. rules related to government 
deficit - the 3% deficit rule and rule related to government debt (the 60% debt rule 
and the 1/20 per year correction in case it is breached). The second pillar of 
economic governance is a surveillance and enforcement mechanism that aims to 
prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances within the EU that have spill-over 
effects. It consists of a scoreboard of early warning macroeconomic indicators for 
the timely identification of internal and external imbalances and the surveillance 
procedure13. Third pillar of the economic governance relates to the coordination of 
national economic and social policies in order to prevent fiscal and macroeconomic 
imbalances and to stimulate growth and jobs in Europe. The fourth pillar is on 
financial solidarity.  
 
4. EUROPEAN SEMESTER AND THE COUNTRY SPECIFIC 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The European Semester (ES) is one of the main pillars of the European economic 
governance model. It is called European Semester as during that time period each 
year Member States’ budgetary, macro-economic and structural policies are 
coordinate in order to allow states to take Commission consideration into account 
during their national budgetary processes and in other aspects of their economic 
policymaking.  
 
Within the framework of the ES several key stages are established. Starting point 
of the European Semester (ES) is a publication of the Annual Growth Survey 
(AGS) and the Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) usually in November/December of 
the preceding year14. AGS sets out EU priorities for the coming year to boost 
growth. Usually in June the Commission drafts Country Specific 
Recommendations (CSRs) proposing economic policy measures for each Member 
State, depending on the country’s economic and social performance in the previous 
year. The recommendations are based on the results of a country report and reflect 
the priorities set out in the AGS. The CSRs are then adopted in July by the 
European Council.15 
                                                          
13There is so called preventive and a corrective phase while the preventive phase includes 
the Commission's Alert Mechanism Report (AMR). The corrective phase refers to the 
Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP), the corrective action plans, the assessment of the 
Member State's corrective action and potential financial sanctions.  
142017 Semester Cycle (AGS and AMR) started 27 November 2017. 
15 Implementation of the 2017 Semester Cycle was at ECOFIN Council (EE) on 24 January 
2018. On 28 June 2018 the EC presented its CSRs 2018.  
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The CSRs are tools designed to enhance the economic growth and job creation in 
Europe, while maintaining sound public finances. They are proposed by the 
Commission within the framework of the European Semester, based on its 
assessments of Member States’ medium-term budgetary plans and economic 
reform programmes in the light of broad policy priorities outline in the AGS. 
 
The Commission, as the integral part of the European Semester cycle produces in-
depth assessment of each Member State’s implementation progress against the 
previous year’s CSRs. CSR implementation is assessed on the basis of actions 
taken rather than observed outcomes. Deroose and Griesse (2014) conclude that 
“the quantification of qualitative information is notoriously difficult and subject to 
judgement issues”. It is also observed that CSRs are not all equally important, as 
within each country, but also across countries.  
 
4.1. The Country Specific Recommendations – implementations and issues 
 
The Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) provide guidance to the EU 
Member States on macro-economic, budgetary and structural policies in 
accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 16(TFEU). 
They are issued within the framework of the European Semester with the aim to 
boost economic growth and in the same time maintaining sound public finances 
and preventing excessive macroeconomic imbalances. Therefore, the CSRs include 
both fiscal requirements based on the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth 
Pact and other requirements based on the prevention of the macro imbalances. In 
addition, they include advices for the national reforms in order to achieve more 
‘inclusive and sustainable growth’.  
 
The European Commission identifies priority areas for action each year in its AGS 
that mutually reinforce one another. The European Semester focuses on those areas 
(fiscal responsibility, structural reforms, investments and recently employment 
policy and social protection). The CSRs focussed on those four priorities. First one 
is in regard to the investments that will support growth in EU. In order to achieve 
such objectives, barriers to financing and launching investment projects were 
envisaged. Then the second area is on structural reforms in product, service and 
labour markets that raise productivity, competitiveness and investment, as well as 
in the financial sector to ease access to finance for investment. The third area is 
about sound fiscal policies that strike a balance between short-term stabilisation 
and long-term sustainability. In MSs with weak fiscal position (both deficits and 
debt) further efforts are required to fix their balance sheets, and in MSs with fiscal 
space expansionary stance towards productive investment should be taken. The 
fourth area is in regard to the improvement of employment and social protection.   
 
                                                          
16 Article 121 and 148. 
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The Country Specific Recommendations was a first time issued in 2011 to the 
twenty-two countries, except Member States with macroeconomic adjustment 
programme linked to EU financial assistance (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Latvia and 
Romania) which do not receive CSRs. 
 
The number of CSRs given to the MSs during the first period until 2015 every 
subsequent year increased, namely from 118 in 2011 to 138 in 2012, then to 141 in 
2013 and 157 in 2014. But, since the 2015 CSRs have been prepared in line with 
the co-called streamlined approach that is characterised by fewer and refocused 
CSRs. Hradisky and Ciucci (2018) add that “under the streamlined Semester, the 
recommendations also put greater emphasis on the objective to achieve, while 
largely leaving definition of the measures needed to attain it to the discretion of 
national authorities”. The total number of recommendations issued to MSs was 
more than halved in 2018 and amount only 73 CSRs. The reason of such reduction 
Hradiskyand Ciucci (2018) are explaining with the new focus and prioritisation of 
the Semester and the fact that some policy areas that were covered separately in 
one Semester cycle have been merged during the next cycle”. The number of MSs 
for that the CSRs have been issued also has gradually increased as the Member 
States that receive the financial assistance successfully exited from the related 
programmes (Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus). 
 
The experience with ES and the implementation of CSRs after several years of the 
implementation clearly shows that results are not encouraging. In the Graf 1 the 
implementation of CSRs is presented since 2011. The best results and the highest 
percentage of full progress were recorded in 2011 which was the first year after the 
CSRs were introduced. But, it should be noted that the different methodology were 
used for that year (with only three assessment categories17). These results cannot be 
converted into the current five-point scale, so the interpretation of the achievements 
should take that into account. It is also evident from the Graf that in year 2016 the 
percentage of the full implementation of CSRs was less than in the previous year. 
Also, for the last four years almost the same percentage of the CSRs is labelled 
with “no progress” with just slightly improvements in 2016.  
 
  
                                                          
17Namely,‘no implementation’, ‘partial implementation’, ‘full implementation’. 
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Figure 1. Implementation of country-specific recommendations: yearly assessment 
in each consecutive year 
 
 
Source: Communication from the Commission on 2017 European Semester: 
Country-specific recommendations (EC, 2017) 
 
Looking also at the first years of the CSRs implementation it is noted (see Graf 2) 
that CSRs that were categorized as ‘fully implemented’ decreased significantly. In 
contrast to that trend the CSRs implemented with ‘limited’ progress increased 
dramatically from 24.5% in 2012 to 43.3% in 2013. The same trend continues in 
2014 where the percentage of CSRs implemented with ‘limited’ progress reached 
almost 45%. Gern, Jannsen, Kooths (2015) also observed that the CSRs have been 
insufficiently addressed by Member States. Only around ten percent of 
recommendations have been fully or substantially met, meaning that Member 
States have adopted and implemented measures that are appropriate or go a long 
way in addressing the country-specific recommendations. At the same time, the 
share of recommendations which have been insufficiently addressed, where 
adoption or implementation is at risk or no measures have been announced or 
adopted at all (limited or no progress in implementation) has risen from 29 percent 








Source: Gern et al. (2015) Economic policy coordination in the euro area under the 
European Semester, Kiel Institute for the World Economy 
 
Only around one third of the country-specific recommendations issued until 2017 
have been implemented with ‘limited progress’, while 44% of them were 
implemented with ‘some progress’ (see Graf 3). The reasons for such relatively 
poor results are often contributed to the several factors of which one is timing. 
Namely, the implementation of reforms takes time, so it was suggested that it is 
important to assess the process over the medium term and not only the short term 
perspective. Ragot (2017) is of opinion that the question of the timing is relevant as 
some reforms may have effects in the long run, while others may have a direct 
effect already in the short run.  
 
Since the start of the European Semester in 2011, the pace of progress – as assessed 
one year after the adopting of the recommendations – has been slightly decreasing. 
The EC is arguing that this could be because politically easier reforms were done 





Figure 3. Overall implementation of 2011-2017 CSRs 
 
Source: European Commission, 2018 European Semester: Country-specific 
recommendations 
 
Deroose and Griesse (2014) argue that “an interesting angle from which to look at 
CSRs implementation by country is the national electoral cycle. Namely, the 
average implementation was superior when CSR adoption was not followed by an 
election within 12 months. The Member States also act in the way to ‘pick the low-
hanging fruit’ first and more challenging set of CSRs in subsequent rounds of the 
European Semester “.  Ragot argues (2017) that “it raises political issues, as it may 
involve some financial costs or the use of limited political capital. He also noted 
that “one cannot expect an ownership of different types of reform to be the same. 
In addition, the tools to incentivize reform implementation cannot be the same for 
the all types of reforms, as their legal basis differs” (Ragot, 2017). 
 
Regarding the question of the policy areas identified within the CSRs it is evident 
from the Graf 4 that they are covering a very broad set of policy areas - from public 
finances and taxation, to structural policies and public administration, including a 
wide range of sub-activities. The implementations of policy reforms activities 
during the period 2011-2016 on average is relatively modest as the degree of 
progress ranges between ‘limited’ and ‘some’ for most policy areas identified, 
meaning that there is still work to be done before the reforms are fully 
implemented and deliver results. 
 
The best result in the implementation is for financial sector reform and public 
finance. Deroose and Griesse (2014) argue that “the financial sector reform 
recommendations (most of which concern the banking sector) stronger 
implementation may be related to the urgency of policy actions in view of financial 
stability concerns and concomitant market pressure in several Member States. For 
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public finances, the stronger implementation record may reflect not only market 
pressure, but also the fact that fiscal recommendations are in large part derived 
from the Member States ‘obligations stipulated by the EU’s Stability and Growth 
Pact, such as the reduction of the general government deficit to below 3% of GDP 
or reduction of public debt”. These rules come with significant enforcement 
powers, notably financial sanctions, so they may spur compliance (Deroose and 
Griesse, 2014).  
 
The lowest implementation records of CSRs are usually within the area of tax 
reform as characterized like a politically highly sensitive and with the direct 
distributional implications (Deroose and Griesse, 2014). Similar is also in area of 
education and public administration reform where the implementation of CSRs are 
relatively low. It is understandable as all policy areas do not have the same 
economic or political relevance, so it would be desirable to make a hierarchy of 
them.  
 
Figure 4. Policies areas covered in the country-specific recommendations 
 
Source: European Commission, 2017 European Semester: Country-
specificrecommendations 
 
Darvas and Leandro (2015) in their analysis of the implementation at the CSRs 
from 2011-2015 they calculate a European Semester reform implementation index 
(which ranges between zero where is no progress and one where is full 
implementation of CSRs). Their study shows that the track record of 
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implementation of CSRs is modest and deteriorating and that the average value of 
the reform implementation index for the 21 EU countries for which 
recommendations were made every year since 2011 was 40 percent. Finally, they 
conclude that “Despite the collective decision to create the new system of policy 
coordination, the findings how that the European Semester has been rather 
ineffective. This failure highlights the fundamental problem of policy coordination 
in the EU: national policymakers are accountable to their national parliaments and 
focus on national interest, which in many cases differ widely in different Member 
States”(Darvas and Leandro,2015).The implementations of CSRs for the period 
from 2013-2017 are almost the same and they show on average relatively poor 
results as it ranges between ‘limited progress’ and ‘some progress’, meaning that 
on average Member States fell short on adopting measures to address the 
recommendations. It should be noted that the deterioration in the implementation of 
CSRs coincides with the streamlining of the CSRs which reduced their number and 
length. 
 
Besides the Commission’ assessments of the implementation of CSRs there are not 
so many others. Recently, Efstathiou and Wolff (2018) produced interesting 
analysis but using the dataset of scores from the Commission. They transformed 
scores into numerical variables in order to find the average implementation scores. 
Despite the simplicity of the synthetic indicator (with equal weights assigned to 
each CSRs the score per country) their analysis coincides with the Commission’s 
qualitative country assessments18.  
 
One should argue that the relatively disappoint results of the implementation of the 
CSRs are achieved because there are so many different procedures and rules in 
place introduced by different regulations and that is difficult to follow all that. 
There is also view that the current system “strengthens procedures, but not 
institution and that the role of the Commission has been weakened, while the Euro-
group lost authority” (Pisani-Ferry, 2018). 
 
In regard to the role of institutions within the ES the debate is going on the 
relevance of the inclusion of other especially non-EU institutions, especially the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Pisani-Ferry (2018) is of opinion that “the 
IMF and ECB only complicate situation for the countries that are under the 
financial assistance programmes”. On the other hand, he is he is in favour of the 
introduction of a new bodies in the institutional structure of the European 
                                                          
18The countries with highest implementation scores were Finland, the United Kingdom, 
Slovenia, Malta and Spain. The implementation was the lowest in Luxembourg, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Germany and Bulgaria.The implementation in countries including Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands has fluctuated significantly, but they conclude that “It is beyond the 
scope to examine the political economic factor driving the country actions. The factors 
include issues such as the capacity of a country to put in place reforms, electoral cycles and 
the business cycle”. 
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Semester, as well as for the broadening the remit of existing (like a fiscal councils). 
He is also proposing to create the National Competitiveness Councils in order to 
monitor current accounts, development in exchange rates etc.  
 
It is evident that proposals to improve current EU governance framework are 
headed in several directions. Most of the proposals are concentrated to the 
applications of current rules, pointing out that the sustainability of the public 
finances is more relevant economically than the fiscal rule - 3% deficit and 60% 
debt ceilings (De Streel (2013). There is also many criticisms about the calculation 
of the (structural) deficit, as it is rather complex and methodology is not so 
transparent. Comments are that such situation is not in favour of the 
implementation of the reforms prescribed by the CSRs as it is difficult to explain it 
to the general public, “hence the case for painful socioeconomic reforms to meet 
those rules is more difficult to make” (De Streel (2013). 
 
Regarding the improvements within the implementation of the CSRs the issue of 
the national ownership dominates. There are views in favour of enhanced dialogues 
between institutions in order to raise awareness of the effects of the budgetary 
decision between Member States, as well as strengthening the oversight of 
parliamentary bodies over their executives. Furthermore, the sanctions mechanism 
exists, but it was not applied to the Member States that are not performing well.   
 
Several authors are arguing that the better transparency is needed for the 
functioning of the whole system and especially for the explanation of the 
methodology in the case of EDP. De Streel (2013) observes regarding the fines that 
“their credibility and effectiveness depend on their timing and on the situation of 
the Member States concerned. The fines are effective if they are imposed or 
threatened to be imposed early in the surveillance procedure and when the Member 
State concerned does not face a liquidity of solvency crisis”.  
 
It is also true that the MSs may respond to recommendations on structural policies 
with so many measures and that would be difficult to say whether these measures 
will achieve intended results. Zuleeg (2015) is pointing out that the 
“implementation gap will remain, craven by a fundamental political economy 
problem; namely because of the fact that the implementation of reforms is decided 
at the EU level and need to be justified politically at the national level”: 
 
Regarding the Country Specific Recommendations there is a common agreement 
that they are usually precise, but that contain a number of targets. Alcidi and Gros 
(2014) argue that “they consist of other policy recommendations which can be 
quite vague and contain exhortations, without giving any precise target to be 
achieved. The implementation of the structural part of the CSRs is also often too 
vague to allow one to judge about the implementation. They are also arguing that 
“the politically and financially strong countries tend to ignore CSRs, while the 
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politically and financially weaker countries usually respond to recommendations 
on structural policies with many measures, but it is often difficult to say whether 
these measures will achieve the intended results” (Alcidi and Gros, 2014). 
Therefore, Schneider, Zuleeg and Emmanouilidis (2014) propose that “the 
Commission together with the European Parliament focus the process on a smaller 
number of key priorities for each country, with a strong attention on the future 
growth”. They are in favour of the strict implementation of CSRs and the 
introduction of sanctions if the key recommendations are not implemented. 
 
Efstathiou and Wolff (2018) make a remark that “the ES exercise is a very difficult 
to digest and communication of key analyses and recommendations could be 
significantly improved to make them more accessible”. Regarding the transparency 
of the European Semester some authors, like Gern, Jannsen and Koots (2015) state 
that “the transparency of the ES could be strengthened by being more explicit on 
the theoretical foundations on which recommendations are based”. They also stress 
that “it is particularly important to elaborate a coherent theoretical framework for 
those events that threaten the functioning of the EU economic governance as a 
whole and that a common understanding is crucial for creating ownership for 
policy initiatives that are supposed to address common interest shared by all MSs”.  
Namely, as the economic policy is left under the authority of the MSs the 
implementation rate of CSRs will remain relatively low whenever conflict with the 
aims of national authorities. Furthermore, the decision-making process is 
complicated even more because of “the mistrust among Member States and 
between them and the Commission, so it represents an essential barrier that needs 




It is obvious that in spite of the reforms introduced to improve the European 
Semester still some shortcomings exist. The CSRs implementation record is 
marked by a downward trend since the introduction. The experiences so far show 
that the current governance framework relies on a complex set of institutions and 
procedures in order to provide recommendations to the MSs in accordance to the 
EU rules. Such governance model also involves so many actors, legal basis and 
different competences.  
 
The main issues on the CSRs and on the European economic governance had been 
brought up. The paper just highlighted main shortcoming of the European 
governance system and present some of the problems that are facing the EU’s 
economic coordination.  
 
The policy coordination is a very broad concept and the European economic 
governance/ES is a well-intentioned attempt to foster (macroeconomic) policy 
coordination between MSs. Because of the implications and complexity some of 
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the recommendations classified as politically costly are less likely to be followed 
by policy implementation. Besides, it is difficult to determine which of the reforms 
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